Patent Cases and Public Controversies by Rinehart, Amelia Smith
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 89 | Issue 1 Article 8
11-2013
Patent Cases and Public Controversies
Amelia Smith Rinehart
University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 361
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-1\NDL111.txt unknown Seq: 1 19-NOV-13 14:34
PATENT  CASES  AND  PUBLIC  CONTROVERSIES
Amelia Smith Rinehart*
INTRODUCTION
A patent could be described as a private solution to a public problem—
the government grants to an inventor a private exclusive right to his inven-
tion for a limited time in order to encourage the promotion of progress to
benefit the public as a whole.1  When someone infringes that private right,
the patentee enforces his exclusive right in federal court by filing a civil
action for patent infringement pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 281.2  But what hap-
pens when a member of the public wishes to challenge the merits of that
private right?  Some members of the public might like to practice the inven-
tion without consequence—this group could include competitors, hopeful
market entrants, patent licensees, or even strangers to the patent owner.
Other people might believe that the patent harms them and others (includ-
ing the government sovereign itself) by restricting competition and limiting
innovation or by offending on moral or ethical grounds.  Because the tradi-
tional Article III inquiry in such cases revolves around the reciprocal (and
often hypothetical) infringement case that could be brought by the patentee
against the challenging party, conventional wisdom holds that the former
group, the practicing public, would be welcome in federal court while the
latter group, the non-practicing public, would not.
© 2013 Amelia Smith Rinehart.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting to Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
2 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006) (providing a civil action for infringement); see also id. § 271
(defining infringement).
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Despite improbable chances for justiciability,3 several recent cases chal-
lenge this conventional wisdom, revealing a trend in patent litigation
whereby members of the public bring suits to challenge patents, including
Ass’n of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (“AMP”),4 Mama Cares Foun-
dation v. Nutriset Société Par Actions Cimplifiée (“Mama Cares”),5 and Organic Seed
Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co. (“OSGTA”).6  In these public patent
litigations, the declaratory plaintiffs seek to invalidate patents on a variety of
grounds.  In AMP and OSGTA, the declaratory plaintiffs claim the patents—
gene patents in AMP and genetically modified food patents in OSGTA—are
invalid on statutory subject matter grounds.7  In Mama Cares, the declaratory
plaintiffs claim that the patents, directed toward ready-to-eat therapeutic
food products and processes, are invalid on other grounds of patentability
(e.g., lack of novelty, non-obviousness, or inadequate disclosure).8  In each
case, the declaratory plaintiffs are not presently infringing the patents—the
Mama Cares plaintiffs and some AMP plaintiffs desire to infringe; all of the
OSGTA plaintiffs fear inevitable infringement sometime in the future.  In all
three cases, public interest groups, such as the American Civil Liberties
Union and the Public Patent Foundation, support the declaratory plaintiffs
in their quest for invalidation.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
3 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (“Justiciability is the term of art employed
to give expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-and-con-
troversy doctrine.”); LINDA MULLENIX ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL COURTS AND JURIS-
DICTION § 2.01 (1998) (explaining justiciability).
4 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (AMP), 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
aff’d in part on other grounds, rev’d in part on other grounds, sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (AMP II), 133 S. Ct. 2107 (June 13, 2013); see Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated on other grounds, sub
nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) (chal-
lenging the validity of patents for isolated DNA sequences).  The Court addressed a
groundbreaking question in its 2013 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc. (AMP II) case: are human genes patentable?  Without addressing the question of jus-
ticiability, the Court affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part the Federal Circuit’s refusal to
invalidate the patent claims in suit directed to isolated DNA material and to cDNA (or
synthetic DNA) material.  The Court held that isolated DNA claims were invalid and not
patent eligible subject matter under § 101 because they claimed naturally occurring phe-
nomena. AMP II, 133 S. Ct. at 2117–19.  The Court held that cDNA claims, in contrast,
were patent eligible because they did not claim “products of nature.” Id. at 2119.  The
Court did not review a question raised by the petitioners for review of the Federal Circuit’s
finding of standing on behalf of just one plaintiff. See AMP II, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2013) (grant-
ing the petition for writ of certiorari as to question one only); Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari at i, AMP II, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398).
5 Mama Cares Found. v. Nutriset Société Par Actions Cimplifiée (Mama Cares), 825 F.
Supp. 2d 178, 183 (D.D.C. 2011).
6 Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co. (OSGTA), 851 F. Supp. 2d
544, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 718 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
7 In other words, on the grounds that the patented subject matters are not eligible for
patent protection at all, per 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
8 First Amended Complaint at 8, Mama Cares, 825 F. Supp. 2d 178 (No. 1:09-cv-
02395).
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(“Federal Circuit”) twice approved of jurisdiction in AMP9 but found the
OSGTA controversy moot.10  A district court dismissed Mama Cares for lack of
jurisdiction.11  Each court came to a decision on jurisdiction (and therefore
justiciability) by referring to the likelihood (or lack thereof) of an infringe-
ment suit by the patent owner and by citing the same Supreme Court and
Federal Circuit precedent.  However, the courts’ views of that precedent and
the Supreme Court’s policy preference to encourage patent challenges raise
questions regarding justiciability in patent cases and in public law cases
generally.
As discussed below, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the most recent
case from the Supreme Court addressing declaratory judgment justiciability,
instructs courts considering declaratory cases (including patent ones) to
embrace the flexibility of Article III justiciability by simply asking whether a
declaratory plaintiff has a sufficiently real and immediate legal dispute with
the declaratory defendant.12  A broad view of MedImmune’s Article III juris-
prudence in declaratory patent cases could facilitate public litigants challeng-
ing patents in courts.  Such public patent litigation would further a strong
public interest in challenging invalid patents—an interest that courts, includ-
ing the Supreme Court, have championed for decades.13  However, despite
MedImmune’s hint of flexibility in applying its stated standard of reality and
immediacy, the question of Article III justiciability in lower courts focuses on
identifying an underlying coercive action that could be brought by the
declaratory defendant.  (In other words, the request for anticipatory relief
necessitates asking the declaratory plaintiff, “You anticipate what exactly?”)  In
a declaratory patent case, the underlying coercive action for infringement
reorients the Article III inquiry toward the patentee’s intent to enforce his
patent rights and the declaratory plaintiff’s desire to exploit non-infringing
activity.14  Thus, a contextual reading of MedImmune (itself a licensing dis-
pute) and its progeny reveals a narrower view of justiciability that reiterates
our federal civil litigation system’s commitment to private adjudication even
in patent cases where the public stakes may be large.
9 AMP, 689 F.3d at 1323; Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1348.  Notably, the
Supreme Court declined to address the question of justiciability presented in the petition
for certiorari.  See supra note 4. R
10 OSGTA, 718 F.3d at 1361–61.
11 See Mama Cares, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 183 (dismissing the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
12 See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007).
13 See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969) (stating that “enforcing this
contractual provision would undermine the strong federal policy favoring the full and free
use of ideas in the public domain”); Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d
Cir. 1943) (“We have disposed of the patent as a whole because it has seemed to us proper
that it should not remain in the art as a scarecrow.”).
14 The activity could be non-infringing because it operates outside of the claims of the
patent or because the activity operates within the claims of an invalid patent.
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Despite courts’ doublethink15 in declaratory patent cases like MedIm-
mune—simultaneously promoting public patent challenges as a matter of pat-
ent policy and private litigation as a matter of law—these cases have not
created an open door to federal court for public patent litigants. MedIm-
mune’s reminder that rigorous rules have no place in Article III justiciability
determinations appears to be disregarded in the declaratory patent case.
Post-MedImmune cases in the Federal Circuit and in lower courts insist upon a
showing of affirmative acts from the patentee indicating an intention to
enforce his patent and affirmative acts from the declaratory plaintiff indicat-
ing that she is “ready, willing and able” to infringe the patents at any time in
order to establish the legally cognizable interest required for justiciability.16
Declaratory patent plaintiffs who allege injuries outside of the traditional
harm of patentees’ threatened coercive actions for infringement (what the
Federal Circuit refers to as “a restraint on the free exploitation of non-
infringing goods”17) remain excluded from federal courts despite arguably
presenting other injuries of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant relief.
In traditional cases where the patentee explicitly or implicitly threatens to
bring an infringement suit against a declaratory plaintiff making meaningful
preparations to infringe (or already infringing), courts reach the same results
as under the older reasonable apprehension of suit test abrogated in MedIm-
mune.18  In cases involving privileged parties (like licensees or covenantees)
or in cases involving a member of the public seeking to challenge the patent
on public interest grounds, courts struggle to identify an underlying coercive
cause of action for infringement based upon such affirmative acts by the pat-
entee and declaratory plaintiff.
The growing interest in public interest patent litigation, as evidenced by
cases like AMP and others, suggests that there is room for improvement in
the jurisprudence of justiciability in declaratory patent cases.  Moreover,
MedImmune’s long game—shifting the focus from a bright-line rule based
upon the relative certainty of an infringement action to an adverse interests
standard—suggests that public patent litigation could be encouraged as the
15 “Doublethink” means a simultaneous belief in two contradictory ideas. Doublethink
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/double-
think (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).  George Orwell coined the word in his novel, 1984.  See
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 9 (1949).
16 See Arris Group, Inc. v. British Telecomms. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2011); SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
17 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(quoting Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18 See BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (not-
ing that courts had developed a pragmatic two-part reasonable apprehension of suit test,
which considered the same two factors as new post-MedImmune cases, namely the existence
of “(1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee . . . and (2) present activity which
could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such
activity” (citing Jervis B. Webb Co. v. S. Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1398–99 (Fed. Cir.
1984))).
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best mechanism for challenging patents that may negatively impact society.
Recognizing that members of the public have an interest in invalidating pat-
ents deemed costly for society as a whole and an even greater interest in the
patent system’s overall legacy of legitimacy in granting the right to exclude
only when deserved, this Article proposes that MedImmune’s doublethink be
resolved by allowing certain members of the public standing to sue patentees
in order to invalidate patents.  A limited citizen’s right to invalidate a patent
would supplement the private right to invalidate that is afforded to alleged
infringers and would improve the overall legitimacy of the patent system.
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I summarizes the evolution of the
current standard for justiciability in declaratory patent cases, including the
Supreme Court’s MedImmune opinion and its progeny in the Federal Circuit
and the lower courts.  Part II discusses the growing trend of public interest
patent litigation and the hurdles declaratory plaintiffs face on justiciability
grounds despite courts’ approval of patent challenges generally on policy
grounds.  Finally, Part III introduces a legislative reform that promises to
afford justiciability for some members of the public without compromising
Article III’s emphasis on private adjudication.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF A JUSTICIABILITY STANDARD
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all suits “arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents.”19  The majority of patent cases sat-
isfy this jurisdictional requirement by arising under 35 U.S.C. § 281, which
grants to a patentee the “remedy by civil action for infringement of his pat-
ent.”20  A patentee seeking to enforce the limited, exclusive rights secured by
his patent may file suit against any party who makes, uses, sells, or offers for
sale the invention claimed by the patent or who imports the invention into
the United States.21  Because patents enjoy a presumption of validity by stat-
ute,22 a patentee need not establish that his patent meets the requirements
for patentability in order to proceed with his infringement suit in federal
court; proving ownership suffices for a civil action brought under 35 U.S.C.
19 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (Supp. V 2011); see 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 21.02[1][b].  For the history of exclusive federal jurisdiction in patent cases, see Donald
S. Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46
WASH. L. REV. 633, 636 (1971).  Conventional wisdom holds that Congress intended to
promote uniformity of decision and to encourage the development of expertise on the
bench. Id.  The formation of the Federal Circuit in 1982 reiterated these goals in the
context of appeals from patent cases. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989).
20 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006).  Other cases that “arise under the patent laws” not involving
civil actions for infringement also implicate federal question jurisprudence but are beyond
the limited scope of this Article focusing on the declaratory patent case.
21 The statute further defines an infringer as “whoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell . . . or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term
of the patent therefor.” Id. § 271.
22 Id. § 282.
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§ 281.23  Anyone sued by the patentee for infringement may challenge the
validity of any patent claim in suit as an affirmative defense to liability.24  If a
defendant establishes with clear and convincing evidence that a patent claim
is invalid, the claim cannot be infringed and will be unenforceable as to the
world (meaning the patentee cannot bring future civil actions of infringe-
ment of that particular claim against anyone).25
The patent laws do not provide a statutory cause of action to citizens to
contest the validity of a patent.26  Prior to 1934, courts could not provide
equitable anticipatory relief in any fashion; even an alleged infringer could
not bring his own suit in federal court for declarations of invalidity or non-
infringement.27  Therefore, a member of the public seeking to challenge a
patent had to wait until the patentee sued her in federal court for patent
infringement.28  Only accused infringers had the opportunity to invalidate
patents and then only as defendants in infringement suits.  If the patentee
was reluctant to sue, whether because he preferred to leverage the threat of
suit, because he did not have the resources to sue, because practicing the
invention was done with his authority under a license, or because he was not
23 Lorenz v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 305 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1962) (“The presumption
of validity relieves the patent holder of the burden of establishing that validity as a requisite
for the successful maintenance of an infringement action, and places the burden of estab-
lishing invalidity on the alleged infringer who asserts it.”); see 6 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S
WALKER ON PATENTS § 17.16 (4th ed. 2012) (“[T]he patent owner in a suit for infringe-
ment need only allege that the patent in suit was duly issued.”); FED. R. CIV. P. Form 18
(providing sufficient complaint for patent infringement).
24 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).
25 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (confirming
that “§ 282 requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence”);
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 332–333 (1971) (holding
that a declaration of invalidity creates a collateral estoppel barrier against further litigation
involving the patent unless the patent owner can demonstrate that he did not have “a full
and fair chance to litigate the validity of his patent”).
26 There are several avenues for contesting patent scope or validity by petitioning the
United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) for further review after the patent
issues.  The patent owner may apply to the USPTO for a reissue of the patent with an
amended claim scope if he believes that he has mistakenly under- or over-claimed his
invention.  The patent owner or any third party also may apply to the USPTO for reexami-
nation of the patent on the basis that a newly discovered printed publication raises a sub-
stantial question of patentability.  USPTO rules limit the applicability and participation of
third parties during the administration of such challenges, which resemble the examina-
tion process itself.  The USPTO examination, reissue, and reexamination processes, and
any subsequent appellate procedures between the applicant or owner and the USPTO
itself, provide the only truly public policing mechanism wherein the government serves as
an agent for the public’s interest in avoiding burdensome patents.  For an overview of
policy and procedures, see the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, available at
http://mpep.uspto.gov/RDMS/detail/manual/MPEP/e8r9/d0e18.xml (last visited Sept.
10, 2013); see also infra Part III.
27 Edwin Borchard, The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 35, 39–40
(1934).
28 Id.
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aware of the infringement, a potential infringer who believed the patent inva-
lid and unenforceable risked accruing damages to the patentee if he engaged
in arguably infringing activity before the patentee brought suit.
This dilemma—“an in terrorem choice between the incurrence of a grow-
ing potential liability for patent infringement and abandonment of [his]
enterprises”29—spurred passage of the 1934 Declaratory Judgments Act,
which, for the first time, allowed potential infringers to “clear the air” by
seeking declaratory relief in federal court instead of waiting for the patent
owner to file an infringement suit.30  This unique remedy allows for anticipa-
tory rather than coercive relief31 by providing, “[i]n a case of actual contro-
versy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing
of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations
of any interested party seeking such declaration.”32  A declaratory plaintiff
seeking to maintain a patent case (with exclusive federal jurisdiction and
exclusive appeals to the Federal Circuit) need only establish a “case or con-
troversy” as required by Article III of the Constitution (also called constitu-
tional justiciability) and statutory jurisdiction over the claims, typically by
raising a substantial question of patent law.33  Courts generally accept that
parties who request declaratory relief in the form of declarations of invalidity
29 Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
30 Id.
31 See Herman L. Trautman, Federal Right Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Remedy, 7 VAND.
L. REV. 445, 463 (1954).
32 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006).  In patent cases, alleged infringers often request declar-
atory relief in the form of judgments of invalidity, unenforceability, and non-infringement,
whereas patent owners often request declaratory relief in the form of judgments of
infringement, validity, or enforceability.
33 See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807–08 (1986)
(explaining federal jurisdiction); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d
1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that for original jurisdiction to exist there must be
both judicial power under Article III and statutory jurisdiction (citing Valley Forge Chris-
tian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471
(1982))).  A party seeking to contest the validity of a patent may also raise the patent
question of invalidity as a defense in another suit, for example, a contract action brought
by the patent owner to collect royalties under a patent license.  In state cases, the defense
of invalidity would not support federal jurisdiction over the entire case.  In federal cases
brought on other grounds, the defense of invalidity may affect whether the Federal Circuit
has appellate jurisdiction. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,
535 U.S. 826, 829–34 (2002) (finding no jurisdiction for the Federal Circuit when the
defendant asserts patent infringement counterclaim).  For a discussion of Holmes and its
impact on Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction, see Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising
Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253
(2003).  Congress recently overruled Holmes by amending § 1295 jurisdiction for the Fed-
eral Circuit, but this jurisdiction remains tied to claims arising under patent law. Compare
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006), with 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (Supp. V 2011) (allowing Fed-
eral Circuit jurisdiction for “any civil action arising under, or . . . any civil action in which a
party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating
to patents”).
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or unenforceability of a patent raise substantial questions of patent law.34
However, declaratory plaintiffs often face formidable Article III challenges
based upon the general case or controversy requirement as well as the under-
lying doctrines of standing, ripeness and mootness, as discussed below in Sec-
tion I.A.35  In MedImmune, the Supreme Court addressed these Article III
doctrines in a very specific context: that of a declaratory patent case brought
by a non-breaching licensee.  As described more fully below in Section I.B,
the opinion in MedImmune offers two different readings—one narrow, the
other broad—that have important implications in declaratory patent cases
and public law litigation.
A. Article III Doctrines of Justiciability
Because the Court in MedImmune (and its predecessors) implicitly refers
to the underlying doctrines of justiciability—standing (between adverse legal
interests of sufficient reality), ripeness (sufficient immediacy) and mootness
(substantial controversy)—the Federal Circuit has found it helpful to use
these doctrines to answer Article III’s basic question: whether the right party
raises the right interest at the right time.36
34 See Zenie Bros. v. Miskend, 10 F. Supp. 779, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) (“A suit to have a
patent declared invalid for want of invention is one arising under the patent laws, as plainly
as the ordinary suit for infringement.”); EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 809
(2d ed. 1941).  In Professor Borchard’s opinion, such a case “really and substantially
involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, consideration or effect of a law of
Congress.” Id. (quoting Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486, 489 (1917)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).  This general acceptance of federal question jurisdiction in declaratory
patent cases occasionally may run afoul of the well-pleaded complaint rule, especially when
invalidity may be raised in anticipation of a declaratory defendant’s state claims.  In such
cases, important federalism concerns may be implicated. See Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah v.
Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 247 (1952) (“Declaratory proceedings in the federal courts
against state officials must be decided with regard for the implications of our federal sys-
tem. . . . Anticipatory judgment by a federal court to frustrate action by a state agency is
even less tolerable to our federalism.”).
35 The doctrine of mootness remains relevant in some declaratory patent cases but
such issues are beyond the scope of this Article.  For further discussion, see Kelsey I. Nix &
Laurie Stempler, The Federal Circuit’s Interpretation and Application of the MedImmune Stan-
dard for Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 331, 354–58 (2011)
(explaining that in instances where courts apply a mootness analysis, “the MedImmune stan-
dard appears secondary to the constitutional analysis”).
36 See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs. Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (explaining the three-part framework used to establish justiciability); see also
Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (denying juris-
diction on justiciability grounds by viewing Article III’s “ ‘immediacy and reality’ inquiry . . .
through the lens of standing”); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (denying jurisdiction because patentee’s only threats comprised listing a
patent in the Orange Book and thus, “their adverse interests have not ripened into an
actual controversy”).
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One of the most commonly invoked justiciability doctrines,37 standing, is
an “essential and unchanging part” of any Article III case or controversy anal-
ysis.38  In order to establish a justiciable case or controversy:
a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypotheti-
cal; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defen-
dant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision.39
  This framework, focusing on the harm to the plaintiff that she seeks to have
redressed, preserves the private adjudication model in federal courts.  The
injury in fact, causation, and redressability requirements essentially tether an
identified injury to a legally cognizable interest.  Although older cases
addressing what has now become known as the standing doctrine required a
legal wrong, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and its progeny have made clear that
for constitutional standing the injury must be a factual one, provided the
injured party claims a legally cognizable interest that demands relief from the
court.40  In addition to these constitutional requirements, courts also frame
standing in terms of three prudential considerations: 1) if the plaintiff is
alleging violation of a statute or constitutional provision, the claim must be
within the zone of interests of the challenged provision; 2) parties may not
assert a generalized grievance shared by all persons; and 3) a plaintiff cannot
raise the interests of a third party.  (Because these requirements are not
thought to be constitutional, Congress can override them with legislation.41)
  Although standing focuses on the proper party to bring suit, the doctrines
of ripeness and mootness determine when litigation can be brought.42
Often, as the Court in MedImmune noted, “standing and ripeness boil down
to the same question.”43  This overlap is particularly salient in declaratory
37 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (“The Art. III doctrine that requires a
litigant to have ‘standing’ to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most impor-
tant of these doctrines.”).
38 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
39 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81
(2000).
40 Id. For a critical analysis of the injury in fact requirement, see F. Andrew Hessick,
Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275 (2008) (arguing that the
injury in fact requirement undermines the separation of powers in cases where the plaintiff
alleges the violation of a private legal right).
41 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).  For one discussion of another facet of
prudential standing in patent cases, see Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Patent Prudential Standing, 21
GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2321808 (describing the confusion within the Federal Circuit’s
“substantial rights” doctrine for determining whether exclusive licensee plaintiffs have
standing to sue infringers as mirroring the problems and criticisms associated with the
general standing doctrine in federal courts).
42 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.4, at 117 (6th ed. 2012).
43 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007); see Prasco, LLC
v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1338 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The underlying
inquiry, rooted in the requirement that Article III courts cannot issue advisory opinions, is
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patent cases.  When the threat of injury (e.g., a restraint on free exploitation
of non-infringing activity) is remote, one could argue that no injury has been
alleged (standing) or, in the alternative, that the injury would be adequate
but has not yet occurred (ripeness).44  Nevertheless, courts approaching the
justiciability question on ripeness grounds must evaluate “‘both the fitness of
the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration.’”45  “[A]n action is fit for judicial review where further
factual development would not ‘significantly advance [a court’s] ability to
deal with the legal issues presented.’”46  Withholding adjudication causes
hardship to the party who brings suit when the alleged injury (or uncertainty
or threats) has an “‘immediate and substantial impact’” on the declaratory
plaintiff.47
In contrast to ripeness and standing, which consider whether the plain-
tiff initially brings a case or controversy to the court, the mootness doctrine
demands that the standing doctrine’s requisite personal interest exist
throughout the litigation.48  For this reason, like ripeness, mootness often
turns on the timing of the declaratory plaintiff’s injury in fact.  Standing and
ripeness define justiciability at the commencement of the litigation but moot-
ness defines justiciability throughout its existence.49
B. The Path to MedImmune
The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 282, creates the patentee’s right to exclude
others from making, using, selling, and offering to sell the invention; this
right to exclude suffices as the patentee’s legally cognizable interest necessary
under Article III.50  When someone “performs at least one prohibited action
with respect to the patented invention that violates these exclusionary rights,”
the patentee’s legally cognizable interest is injured-in-fact, thus establishing
the same regardless of whether labeled standing, ripeness, or the requirement that the
controversy have ‘sufficient immediacy and reality’ (citing MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 128
n.8)).
44 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 2.4.1, at 117. R
45 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1294–95 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).
46 Id. at 1295 (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of
Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 812 (2003)).  The court might ask whether the remaining questions
are purely legal ones.  Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581
(1985).
47 Caraco Pharm., 527 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n, 387 U.S.
167, 171 (1967)).
48 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 2.5.1, at 129.
49 Id. (citing United States Parole Comm. v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980)).
“‘[M]ootness [is] the doctrine of standing in a time frame.’” Id. (quoting Henry
Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973)
(second alteration in original)).
50 Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Arachnid,
Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-1\NDL111.txt unknown Seq: 11 19-NOV-13 14:34
2013] patent  cases  and  public  controversies 371
the requisite standing to sue.51  Not only would the case be fit for review, but
refusing adjudication would cause hardship to the patentee who seeks to
exercise his private right to exclude others by bringing suit.
When a declaratory plaintiff brings suit requesting anticipatory relief
through the declaratory judgment procedure, the court assessing jus-
ticiability must determine whether the declaratory plaintiff (often, but not
always, an alleged infringer) has shown an injury in fact to her own legally
cognizable interest.  The question in both cases is, does this dispute involve
adverse litigants and is it likely that a favorable federal court decision will
have some effect?52  As noted above, prior to passage of the Declaratory Judg-
ments Act, this was a formidable barrier that prevented courts from provid-
ing declaratory relief in any fashion.53  For example, in Willing v. Chicago
Auditorium Ass’n, the Supreme Court insisted that Article III required a plain-
tiff to demonstrate a legal cause of action, what the lower court in Willing had
described as “a wrong cognizable in courts of justice under the established
principles of law or equity.”54  When a plaintiff, for whatever reason, sought
to obtain a judicial determination of a legal relationship or a settlement of
issues in dispute, he was often turned away from federal courts of equity
unless he could establish “a recognizable title to legal protection.”55  The
declaratory judgment procedure allows for the declaratory plaintiff to
request anticipatory relief without demonstrating her own cause of action.
However, for this very reason, the declaratory posture of the case obfuscates
51 Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
52 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 2.1, at 44.
53 Borchard, supra note 27, at 36–38.  Borchard, a prominent Yale law professor,
strongly advocated the general availability of declaratory remedies and wrote an extensive
treatise on the subject after the Act’s passage. See BORCHARD, supra note 34.  Arguably,
American courts in equity had long recognized their own power to make declaratory judg-
ments without using that terminology, for example, by issuing judgments “construing wills,
interpreting deeds, trying disputed titles to property, real and personal, quieting title and
declaring the non-existence of clouds thereon, declaring the nullity of instruments and
legal relations, including marriage,” establishing boundaries and declaring the validity of
bond issues, and judgments in an infinite variety of proceedings not requiring execution.
Id. at xiv.  Despite this availability in equitable courts of judgments involving some execu-
tory or investitive relief, American courts, even those in equity, were hesitant to award
solely declaratory judgments, in other words, those judgments that simply declared the
rights of parties without coercing relief (as in damages or injunctions) or creating or alter-
ing existing jural relationships (as in granting a divorce or nullifying a marriage). Id. at
138–149.
54 Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass’n, 8 F.2d 998, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 1925), rev’d, 20 F.2d 837
(7th Cir. 1927), rev’d, 277 U.S. 274 (1928).  In Willing, land lessors disagreed with their
tenant over whether the lease gave the tenant the right to tear down a building on the
land.  Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass’n, 277 U.S. 274, 285 (1928).  In denying jurisdiction,
the Court held that the tenant’s doubts and fears did not give rise to a cause of action—
“[n]o defendant has wronged the plaintiff or has threatened to do so”—and hence, the
case lacked constitutional justiciability despite the parties’ adverse interests. Id. at 289–90.
55 Edwin Borchard, The Next Step Beyond Equity—The Declaratory Action, 13 U. CHI. L.
REV. 145, 157 (1946).
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the justiciability analysis (as compared to the relatively straightforward
infringement case).
The Supreme Court first approved of the Declaratory Judgments Act in
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth.56  There, the Court described a justiciable
controversy as one “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of the
parties having adverse legal interests[,] . . . a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief.”57  In doing so, the Aetna Court emphasized that
who presents the controversy to the courts for adjudication does not change
the character of the controversy and of the issue to be determined.58  Later, in
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., the Court refused to
fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such a
controversy. . . . [T]he question in each case is whether the facts alleged,
under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy,
between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and
reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.59
Instead of demanding a cause of action, the Court directed courts to identify
an immediate and real dispute of a legal nature.60  This open-ended standard
preserved the flexibility needed to address the myriad ways in which cases
could arrive in federal court under the Declaratory Judgments Act, yet forced
plaintiffs to prove that anticipatory relief was warranted.  The Court did not
shelve the cause of action requirement, but opened it up to include the
declaratory defendant’s cause of action accrued (perhaps threatened) but
not yet initiated.61
In declaratory patent cases, just the types of cases that the drafters of the
Declaratory Judgments Act had in mind when enacting the legislation,62 the
hypothetical patent infringement cause of action remained paramount
because courts assumed it created the only legally cognizable interests at play
in patent cases.  As a result, the “all the circumstances” standard from Mary-
land Casualty eventually evolved into the Federal Circuit’s familiar two-part
test for determining justiciability in declaratory patent cases:
There must be both (1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee,
which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory
56 300 U.S. 227, 244 (1937).
57 Id. at 240–41 (citations omitted).
58 Id. at 244 (“It is the nature of the controversy, not the method of its presentation or
the particular party who presents it, that is determinative.”).
59 Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).  In Maryland Casualty,
an insurance company and an insured disputed the insurer’s liability on the policy and its
duty to defend the insured in an automobile collision case pending in state court. Id. at
271–72.  The automobile collision involved an employee of the insured driving a truck sold
to him by the insured, which the insurer claimed eliminated its liability on the insurance
policy. Id. at 271.  The Court found an actual justiciable controversy between the parties
and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 274.
60 Id. at 273.
61 Id. at 273–74.
62 See Lisa A. Dolak, Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Patent Cases: Restoring the Balance
Between the Patentee and the Accused Infringer, 38 B.C. L. REV. 903, 910–11 (1997).
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plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity which
could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to con-
duct such activity.63
Under this construct, the legally cognizable interest held by the patentee—
the right to exclude others—has been injured or will soon be injured by the
activity of the declaratory plaintiff that would constitute infringement; this
creates substantial adverse legal interests in the parties (or, in the words of
Aetna, it defines the “character of the controversy”64).  But simple accrual of
an infringement action on the part of the patentee lacked the immediacy
sufficient to pass muster under Aetna and Maryland Casualty.  By requiring a
reasonable apprehension of suit, the Federal Circuit assessed the relative cer-
tainty (or, perhaps, probability) that the patentee actually would bring his
coercive action for infringement against this declaratory plaintiff.65  In other
words, if an underlying infringement action had accrued and was relatively
certain to be brought by the patentee, the case was justiciable under Article
III on standing and ripeness grounds.  Again, as in Aetna, courts cared less
about who was bringing the action than about the character of the action.
When a declaratory plaintiff reasonably worried that the patentee would
bring suit based on his own actions, his dispute was sufficiently real and
immediate to warrant adjudication.  Thus the Federal Circuit test moved
away from assessing only a present or future injury to the patentee’s legally
cognizable interest and instead focused on both the real or threatened injury
to the patentee as well as the potential for harm to the declaratory plaintiff
who sought judicial resolution of the underlying cause of action for infringe-
ment in advance of the patentee bringing suit (if it was to be brought at
all).66
To that end, the first part of this test asked whether the patentee
intended to enforce his exclusive patent rights through a forthcoming
infringement action.67  Explicit threats to file an infringement suit, the sort
of patentee conduct contemplated by Professor Borchard,68 obviously suf-
ficed to establish the requisite reasonable apprehension of suit.69  The Fed-
63 BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
64 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 244 (1937).
65 See David I. Levine & Charles E. Belle, Declaratory Relief after MedImmune, 14 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 491, 517 (2010).
66 Id.
67 Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
68 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
69 See, e.g., Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Med. Prods., Inc., 387 F.3d 1352, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (finding a reasonable apprehension of suit based upon various threats from the
patentee, including that it “would have no choice but to defend its patents against infringe-
ment”); Fina Research, S.A. v. Baroid Ltd., 141 F.3d 1479, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding a
reasonable apprehension of suit based upon letters alleging infringement and threatening
suit); EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 812 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding a reasonable
apprehension of suit based upon, inter alia, a letter suggesting that the management of the
corporate-assignee favored litigation); Zenie Bros. v. Miskend, 10 F. Supp. 779, 781–82
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eral Circuit also approved of jurisdiction in cases involving implicit threats
found in letters to customers suggesting infringement by a manufacturer and
parallel litigations against similarly situated parties.70  At the same time, the
appellate court carefully noted that “more is required than the existence of
an adversely held patent,”71 that a patentee’s offer of a license, without more,
is insufficient to establish the predicate for declaratory judgment jurisdic-
tion,72 and that “proposed or ongoing license negotiations” were likewise
insufficient.73
The second part of the Federal Circuit’s test for justiciability required
that the declaratory plaintiff demonstrate “a true interest to be protected”74
by “examin[ing] whether there had been ‘meaningful preparation’ to con-
duct potentially infringing activity.”75  Often, the parties to the litigation
admitted that such activity existed.76  Without such an admission, courts
tended to turn away remote or speculative cases.  For example, the Federal
Circuit denied justiciability in cases where activities would not be infringing
until a new drug application was filed with the FDA,77 where the declaratory
plaintiff had not built its prototype until at least a year after the suit was
commenced,78 where the product was “years away” from potential FDA
approval,79 and where the allegedly infringing device had never been used,
and likely would not be used in the future.80
By examining the seriousness of the threats made by the patentee in
light of the concrete steps taken by the declaratory plaintiff, the Federal Cir-
(S.D.N.Y. 1935) (finding justiciability based upon threats from patentee to customers of
declaratory plaintiff and approving of declaratory procedure in patent cases).
70 Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 738 (“That a competitor is suing a third party and asking the
court to find one’s company a co-infringer can hardly contribute to euphoria.  The law
does not require enterprises to keep their heads in the sand while a patentee picks them
off one by one and at its leisure.”).
71 BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
72 Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 883 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
73 Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051, 1053 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
74 Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736.
75 Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 879 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Arrow-
head, 846 F.2d at 736); see BP Chems., 4 F.3d at 978 (stating that the declaratory plaintiff
must establish “present activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps
taken with the intent to conduct such activity”); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 955 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that the declaratory plaintiff
“must actually have either produced the device or have prepared to produce that device”).
76 See, e.g., Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 739 (explaining that defendant’s brief stated “a
declaratory judgment plaintiff need only show use or preparation for use of a process that
‘might at trial be found to be an infringement’”).
77 Cat Tech, 528 F.3d at 881 (citing Benitec Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d
1340, 1346–50 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
78 Id. (citing Sierra Applied Scis., Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., Inc., 363 F.3d 1361,
1378–81 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
79 Id. (citing Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1527 (Fed.
Cir. 1992)).
80 Id. (citing Jervis B. Webb Co. v. S. Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1399 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
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cuit’s pre-MedImmune bright-line rule aimed to sort out those cases where the
parties anticipated forthcoming litigation on the issue of infringement (i.e.,
cases in which the declaratory procedure afforded the parties an earlier reso-
lution of a case certain to be brought in the future) and those cases where
future litigation between the parties remained remote, even as to the issue of
infringement.  Granting jurisdiction in the former cases but not the latter
fulfilled the purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act—to provide anticipa-
tory relief where previously none could be had until the coercive action was
filed—and accomplished this with a basic test requiring both an underlying
cause of action and a threat of suit by the holder of that cause of action.81
As a result, the bright-line rule worked best in the kinds of cases
described by Professor Borchard in support of the Declaratory Judgments
Act’s equitable remedy, i.e., the “sad and saddening scenario” where a bully-
ing patentee threatens an infringement action to strong-arm an alleged
infringer into meeting his demands.82  These cases typically involved compet-
itors seeking to enter the patentee’s market.  Even within this category, the
test was less useful when applied in cases where the patentee made few, if
any, infringement overtures or where the declaratory plaintiffs had no mean-
ingful plans for infringement.  Nevertheless, courts considered the totality of
the circumstances to weigh whether an actual case or controversy arose
between the parties to find jurisdiction only in those cases where the dispute
was “of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declara-
tory judgment.”83  In other words, courts asked whether a coercive action
“arising under” the patent laws—always the patentee’s hypothetical coercive
action for infringement—loomed close enough on the horizon such that
anticipatory relief could be granted to the declaratory plaintiff.
Unlike these factually difficult but legally coherent competitor cases,
privileged party cases, where the declaratory plaintiff was a licensee or had
received a covenant not to sue, offered more complexity.  Prior to 1969, a
patent licensee could not contest the validity of a patent subject to his license
agreement in a contract suit over royalty obligations.84  In Lear v. Adkins, the
Supreme Court removed this legal barricade (referred to as licensee estop-
81 See Borchard, supra note 27, at 37.
82 See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 734–35.
83 Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); see C.R. Bard, Inc., v.
Schwarz, 716 F.2d 874, 879 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that justiciability requires “that the
declaratory plaintiff has sufficient interest in the controversy and that there is a reasonable
threat that the patentee or licensor will bring an infringement suit against the alleged
infringer”).
84 See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 836 (1950)
(adhering to rule of licensee estoppel to prevent licensee from challenging the validity of
licensed patents), abrogated by Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).  In cases like Auto-
matic Radio, the Court reasoned that the patent’s validity was irrelevant in royalty suits—the
licensee promised to pay royalties for the option to practice the patented invention regard-
less of validity and regardless of whether the licensee actually exercised that option.  Alfred
C. Server & Peter Singleton, Licensee Patent Validity Challenges Following MedImmune: Impli-
cations for Patent Licensing, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 243, 269 (2011).
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pel), holding that a licensee is not estopped from contesting the validity of
the patent, that a contesting licensee is not required to continue paying roy-
alties during the suit and, if the patent is declared invalid, the licensee’s obli-
gations under the license, including royalty obligations, are void as a matter
of federal patent policy.85  After Lear, the appellate courts developed a split
of decision as to whether a licensee could contest the validity of the licensed
patent without first breaching or terminating the license agreement.86  The
consolidation of patent appeals to the Federal Circuit eventually resolved the
split in favor of patentees.  In Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., the court declined to
grant jurisdiction to a licensee-declaratory plaintiff who continued to pay roy-
alties in protest.87  Without a material breach of the license, the Federal Cir-
cuit deduced, the licensee could have no reasonable apprehension of an
infringement suit.88  In similar cases where the declaratory plaintiff received
a covenant not to sue from the patentee, the Federal Circuit also refused
jurisdiction (or held as moot cases already established) on the grounds that
the covenant (provided it was broad enough to cover past and future alleg-
edly infringing activity) removed any apprehension of suit on the part of the
declaratory plaintiff.89  In both license and covenant cases, the Federal Cir-
85 Lear, 395 U.S. at 670, 673; see Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 780 F.2d 991, 995
(Fed. Cir. 1985).  For a critical analysis of Lear and its effect on patentees’ incentives, see
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72
VA. L. REV. 677 (1986) and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning
Lear? Incentives to Innovate After MedImmune, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971, 976 (2009)
(arguing that MedImmune limits the reach of Lear by permitting licensees to be “‘remuz-
zled’” when the license itself notifies the licensee that his ability to challenge is limited).
86 Emmett F. Hale, III, The “Arising Under” Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: An Opportu-
nity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 242 n.79 (1986).  The Third and
Seventh Circuits required the licensee to breach the license to establish justiciability. Id.
(citing Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 448 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1971); Mil-
print, Inc. v. Curwood, Inc., 562 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1977)).  The Second, Ninth, and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuits did not require breach as a basis for federal jurisdiction. Id.
(citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 567 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1977); Geni-
Chlor Int’l, Inc. v. Multisonics Dev. Corp., 580 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1978); Hanes Corp. v.
Millard, 521 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
87 Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
88 Id.  The court explained that to allow the licensee to invalidate a patent without
materially breaching the license, in effect, would force the licensor (patentee) to bear all
of the risk of the agreement because the licensee will receive the benefit of limited dam-
ages or royalties even if the challenge fails. Id.  Compare C.R. Bard, 716 F.2d at 880–81
(finding jurisdiction when the licensee ceased payments to materially breach the license),
with Cordis, 780 F.2d at 995 (finding no jurisdiction when the licensee placed royalty pay-
ments into escrow).  Interestingly, the Federal Circuit adopted the reasonable apprehen-
sion of suit test to make constitutional justiciability determinations, yet C.R. Bard, its first
licensee case addressing the older circuit split, decided a question of statutory jurisdiction
(“arising under”) rather than constitutional justiciability. See C.R. Bard, 716 F.2d at 880.
The reasonable apprehension of suit test thus appeared to address both constitutional and
statutory jurisdiction.
89 See Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1059–60 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).  In Super Sack, the covenant not to sue was promised during trial but before an
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cuit held that jurisdiction would be inappropriate because anticipatory relief
was not necessary to resolve a dispute between these parties.90  There was no
possibility that the declaratory defendant could bring an infringement action
against this declaratory plaintiff—no underlying legally cognizable interest
supporting an infringement cause of action existed.91
Excluding licensees in good standing from challenging patents created a
quandary for courts.  On one hand, no reasonable apprehension of the hypo-
thetical coercive infringement suit can exist until the protection of the
license ceases.  On the other hand, a licensee, especially one in good stand-
ing, may be the party best suited to challenge the licensed patent.92  The
rigidity of the Federal Circuit’s bright-line rule seemed at odds with the pol-
icy behind the Declaratory Judgments Act to reduce the uncertainty inherent
in moving forward with potentially infringing conduct, as well as federal pat-
ent policy encouraging patent challenges (as outlined in Lear).93  By strictly
adhering to its reasonable apprehension of suit test, the Federal Circuit
failed to include as justiciable those cases where an infringement suit was not
probable (or even possible) but where the parties may have had a real and
immediate patent dispute anyway.
C. The MedImmune Dispute
The courts again faced this issue in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.94
The declaratory plaintiff, MedImmune, Inc. (“MedImmune”) and the paten-
tee, Genentech, Inc. (“Genentech”), initially entered into a license agree-
ment contemplating patents not yet issued and products that MedImmune
was already selling.95  When the patents issued, Genentech informed MedIm-
mune that it owed Genentech royalties on products Genentech believed were
infringement verdict, which the court found to moot any jurisdiction previously estab-
lished under the two-part test. Id.  In Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), the court carved out an exception to the Super Sack rule whereby jurisdiction is
maintained over invalidity claims or counterclaims despite a promise not to sue if the jury
or judge has decided the issue of infringement already. Id. at 1353 (Schall, J., dissenting).
90 See, e.g., Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1381 (explaining that once a license with a covenant
not to sue was formed, “[a] licensee must, at a minimum, stop paying royalties (and
thereby materially breach the agreement)” in order to establish a reasonable apprehension
of suit).
91 See id. (stating that a promise not to sue “obliterated any reasonable apprehension
of a lawsuit”); Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1059 (stating that a promise not to sue “removes from
the field any controversy sufficiently actual to confer jurisdiction over this case”).
92 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (“Licensees may often be the only
individuals with enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor’s
discovery.”). But see Dreyfuss, supra note 85, at 754 n.277 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing “special benefits that would accrue if patent users were encouraged to challenge pat-
ents early”).
93 Lear, 395 U.S. at 673.
94 549 U.S. 118, 120–21 (2007).
95 Id. at 121.
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covered by the licensed patent.96  MedImmune, however, believed that the
patent was invalid and that royalties were not due under the agreement.97
While continuing to pay royalties, it filed a declaratory suit against
Genentech seeking to have the patents declared invalid and not infringed in
order to remove its own royalty obligations.98  The district court applied the
Federal Circuit’s reasonable apprehension of suit test, citing Gen-Probe,99 and
held that MedImmune’s ongoing payment of royalties prevented it from pos-
sessing a reasonable apprehension of suit, thus no case or controversy existed
sufficient to establish constitutional justiciability.100  The Federal Circuit
agreed, affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.101  The
Supreme Court then granted MedImmune’s petition for certiorari to answer
the following question:
Does Article III’s grant of jurisdiction of “all Cases . . . arising under . . . the
Laws of the United States,” implemented in the “actual controversy” require-
ment of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), require a patent
licensee to refuse to pay royalties and commit material breach of the license
agreement before suing to declare the patent invalid, unenforceable or not
infringed?102
In its opinion, the Court first questioned the nature of the dispute at
hand—“whether it involve[d] only a freestanding claim of patent invalidity
or rather a claim that, both because of patent invalidity and because of non-
infringement, no royalties are ow[ed] under the license agreement.”103  The
majority viewed the case as one involving a dispute over whether royalties
were owed under the license agreement, implicating the federal patent ques-
tions of non-infringement and invalidity in order to resolve that contracts
question.104  Concluding that the dispute was really one over whether
MedImmune owed royalties under the license agreement, the Court held
that the dispute between MedImmune and Genentech was sufficiently real
and immediate to support Article III justiciability.105
96 Id. at 121–22.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 122.  As Lear allowed, if a court declares the patent invalid, the licensee avoids
all payment of royalties accruing after he challenges the patent.  395 U.S. at 673.
99 Gen-Probe Inc., v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see supra Section
I.B.
100 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. CV 03-2567 MRP (CTX), 2004 WL
3770589, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2004), aff’d, 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549
U.S. 118 (2007).
101 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549
U.S. 118 (2007).
102 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit at i, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (No. 05-608),
2005 WL 3067195, at *i (alteration in original).
103 MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 123.
104 Id. (“[It] probably makes no difference to the ultimate issue of subject-matter juris-
diction, but it is well to be clear about the nature of the case before us.”).
105 Id. at 137.
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The Court found that Genentech’s continuing demands for MedIm-
mune to pay royalties for permission to use a patent MedImmune believed to
be invalid created a genuine legal interest in the case that could only be
resolved by adjudication.106  The Court rejected the notion that MedIm-
mune had to “bet the farm,” or breach the license, in order to contest the
validity of the licensed patents.107  Further, the Court pointed to the Aetna
and Maryland Casualty cases as examples of Article III controversies featuring
contractual disputes without termination of the contract as a prerequisite to
justiciability.108  Importantly, MedImmune’s desire to avoid accruing patent
infringement damages, including the possibility of willful damages, by seek-
ing declaratory relief before (or in lieu of) materially breaching the license
persuaded the Court that this was just the sort of real and immediate dispute
contemplated by Article III’s case or controversy requirement.109  Accord-
ingly, in the words of the majority opinion, to decide the invalidity question
was “not to decide a hypothetical case.”110  The Court, therefore, reversed the
Federal Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further considera-
tion.111  In a footnote, the Court appeared to abrogate at least the first prong
of the Federal Circuit’s reasonable apprehension of suit test,112 describing
the requirement as contrary to Supreme Court precedent addressing consti-
tutional justiciability, including Aetna and Maryland Casualty.113
In the lone dissent, Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority’s descrip-
tion of the nature of the dispute.  Instead, he viewed the case as one involv-
ing simply a freestanding claim for patent invalidity.114  As such, neither
party had a coercive cause of action (real or hypothetical).115  Genentech
had no cause of action for patent infringement because the contract had not
been repudiated.  MedImmune had no cause of action for any federal claim
because patent invalidity is not a cause of action created under the patent
laws.  In fact, the patent laws expressly identify invalidity as a defense to an
infringement cause of action.116  Genentech’s hypothetical coercive cause of
action could not be brought because the license had not been terminated or
breached; according to Justice Thomas, this meant that MedImmune did not
have a justiciable case or controversy.117
106 Id.
107 Id. at 129.
108 Id. at 133 n.11.
109 Id. at 134.
110 Id. at 131 n.10.
111 Id. at 137.
112 Id. at 132 n.11.
113 Id. The Court did not address the second prong of the test because no dispute
existed as to whether MedImmune was engaged in allegedly infringing activity. Id. at 123.
114 Id. at 140–41 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 146.
116 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2006).
117 MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 141–42 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,
395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969) (holding that parties must be permitted to avoid the payment of
all royalties accruing “during the time they are challenging patent validity”); Studiengesell-
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D. Post-MedImmune Cases
As stated in MedImmune, “ ‘the question in each case is whether the facts
alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial contro-
versy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy
and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’”118  Despite
repeating this worn passage from Aetna and Maryland Casualty, MedImmune’s
factual context introduced a wrinkle—the parties disputed the scope of the
patent license, a dispute no less justiciable than the contractual dispute in
Aetna,119 but involving questions of patent law that also required resolution.
That such a dispute failed the rigorous reasonable apprehension of suit test
sounded an alarm.  Plainly, the parties in MedImmune had immediate and
real adverse legal interests involving both contract law and patent law.120
Consequently, the Court could not reconcile the Federal Circuit’s reasonable
apprehension of an infringement suit test with the uniquely adverse position
of a licensee (like the one in MedImmune) who believes that a licensed patent
is invalid or not infringed, yet cannot afford the risk of breaching the license
and subjecting himself to damages for breach and willful infringement.121
Thus the Court’s rejection of the reasonable apprehension of suit test in
MedImmune may be narrowly read to hold that a patentee’s demand for roy-
alty payments under a patent license suffices to establish the requisite cogni-
zable legal interest when the declaratory plaintiff believes the patent to be
invalid and not infringed by the products for which royalties have been
demanded.122  The hypothetical coercive action for infringement lurks
behind the licensee’s anticipatory repudiation of the license by protesting
royalty payments.
schaft Kohle, M.B.H. v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that
where the court has found the relevant patent claims invalid, the licensor may recover
damages for breach of contract for past royalties due on processes allegedly covered by
such claims, from the date of the alleged breach until the date that the licensee first chal-
lenged validity of the claims).
More likely, Justice Thomas takes issue with the outcome in MedImmune because he
believes it violates the well-pleaded complaint rule for statutory jurisdiction (“arising
under” jurisdiction) because the license, without termination, creates a legal barrier for an
infringement suit even though a declaratory plaintiff disputes whether the license reaches
to certain products or whether the patents are invalid. See Cotropia, supra note 33, at
263–64.  The application (and wisdom) of the well-pleaded complaint rule, even in patent
cases, is beyond the scope of this Article.
118 MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127 (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312
U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
119 Compare Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 242 (1937) (“The dispute
relates to legal rights and obligations arising from the contracts of insurance.”), with
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 124–25 (identifying the nature of the case as revolving around the
duties of each party under a license agreement).
120 Even the Court seemed confused as to what the dispute was about—contract or
patent. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–15, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118 (2007) (No. 05-608).
121 MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 132 & n.11.
122 Id. (abrogating any test that requires a reasonable apprehension of suit).
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Approached more broadly, however, MedImmune’s rejection of the rea-
sonable apprehension of suit test suggests that Article III does not demand
that a hypothetical coercive action for infringement be relatively certain to
occur in order to establish justiciability.  Instead, Article III, even in declara-
tory patent cases, requires a flexible inquiry into what has been harmed (or
will be harmed) by whom such that anticipatory relief should be afforded to a
declaratory plaintiff.  Thus, the Court may be insinuating that the hypotheti-
cal coercive action for infringement should be unmoored from the jus-
ticiability analysis, which could invite plaintiffs to allege any legally cognizable
injury related to the patents in suit.123  Perhaps plaintiffs should be able to
identify and plead legally cognizable injuries that reflect societal harms
resulting from invalid patents—reduced competition, for example.
MedImmune highlights two competing goals: one focused on private dis-
putes over infringement, the other on the private and public harms from
invalid patents.  Together these create what might best be called a double-
think problem—courts openly embrace justiciability in controversies over
patent infringement and validity yet limit this embrace to an identifiable
underlying coercive action for infringement as the touchstone for declara-
tory justiciability, which constrains the availability of patent invalidity actions
to would-be competitors or disgruntled licensees.  Courts following MedIm-
mune attempt to navigate their cases somewhere in between these two shores,
emphasizing a broad, flexible inquiry for Article III justiciability yet anchor-
ing the inquiry to a hypothetical infringement action.  As one court stated,
“[Post-MedImmune,] the trend is to find an actual controversy, at least where
the declaratory judgment plaintiff’s product arguably practices a patent and
the patentee has given some indication it will enforce its rights.”124
Updating its own jurisprudence to reflect MedImmune’s retake on Aetna,
the Federal Circuit now frames the justiciability question as “a dispute as to a
legal right—for example, an underlying legal cause of action that the declar-
atory defendant could have brought or threatened to bring.”125  “A useful
question to ask in determining whether an actual controversy exists is what, if
any, cause of action the declaratory judgment defendant may have against
the declaratory judgment plaintiff . . . .”126  Not surprisingly, even in licensee
cases, the cause of action identified by the court must always involve the
123 Brief of Amici Curiae Erika R. George and Kali N. Murray in Support of the Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology, et. al, at 10, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) (No. 2010-1406).
124 Diamonds.net LLC v. Idex Online, Ltd., 590 F. Supp. 2d 593, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
A more precise statement of the Federal Circuit’s new, wordier test is:
[W]here a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain identified
ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where that party contends that
it has the right to engage in the accused activity without license, an Article III case
or controversy will arise and the party need not risk a suit for infringement by
engaging in the identified activity before seeking a declaration of its legal rights.
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
125 Arris Grp., Inc. v. British Telecomms. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
126 Benitec Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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infringement claim that could be brought by the patentee now or sometime
in the near future against the declaratory plaintiff.127  The Patent Act offers
no other legally cognizable interest to be disputed.  In fact, courts consist-
ently refuse to recognize different legally cognizable patent rights (e.g., the
right to operate in the public domain).128
Accordingly, traditional cases featuring a threatening patentee and an
allegedly infringing competitor are justiciable, as should be cases identical to
MedImmune featuring a licensee challenging patents while continuing to pay
royalties (at least when the licensor has made a demand for royalties, presum-
ably on the grounds that the demand itself would serve as an anticipatory
repudiation sufficing to trigger justiciability).129  That leaves cases in
between—within the competitor category, cases where the patentee offers to
license the patent but negotiations fail to produce an agreement or where
the declaratory plaintiff has not taken any meaningful steps to infringe the
patent yet; and within the privileged party cases, cases where the licensee
hasn’t made a protest or where the patentee has promised not to sue the
declaratory plaintiff for infringement.  In these cases, courts search for a
legally cognizable interest on the part of the declaratory plaintiff, finding it
only in those cases where it believes that the patentee’s infringement cause of
action has accrued through the patentee’s affirmative acts toward the plain-
tiff hinting at enforcement and the plaintiff’s affirmative acts suggesting
infringement will be forthcoming—the accrual of the infringement cause of
action elicits a legally cognizable right to free exploitation of non-infringing
goods or processes.130
Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit struggles with cases on the margins
involving competitors (for example, cases where a competitor has negotiated
for, but failed to procure, a license from the patentee).  The legally cogniza-
ble interest that the Federal Circuit recognizes in declaratory patent cases—
the right to free exploitation of non-infringing activity—cannot suffice for
justiciability.  If it did, all individuals who could be excluded by the patentee
127 This is true even where the infringement action arises through the Hatch-Waxman
Act rather than through a licensor’s explicit threat of suit against a licensee. Compare
Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(applying reasonable apprehension of suit test, which requires explicit acts on part of
defendant to indicate intent to bring a suit for patent infringement), with Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1341–43 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding jus-
ticiability based on a controversy arising through the Hatch-Waxman Act, even though
patent holder had not sued or threatened to sue).
128 See, e.g., Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc. v. Copper Indus., Inc., 131 F.3d 1011, 1015
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he patent laws create no affirmative right supporting a cause of
action against a competitor to assert a right to make or copy what is in the public domain
. . . .”); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (same); see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889–94 (2012) (permitting Congress
to restore copyright protection to works previously in the public domain).
129 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. CV 03–02567 MRP (CTX), 2007 WL
5760839, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2007).
130 SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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would have this right merely because the patent, as private property, gives the
patentee the right to exclude anyone and everyone from practicing what the
patent claims—a principle the Federal Circuit has repeatedly rejected.131
Therefore, courts must find some legally cognizable underlying action for
infringement to find justiciable the declaratory action; they must pinpoint
when the hypothetical infringement action accrued to the patentee in order
to trigger justiciability.  In failed negotiation cases, the Federal Circuit looks
for specific affirmative acts that suggest that the hypothetical infringement
action could be brought by the patentee against this would-be competitor.132
In licensee cases without a failure to pay royalties, MedImmune may allow
courts to find that a dispute over the license evinces the right to free exploita-
tion necessary for justiciability.
Importantly, the Federal Circuit cannot allow for patent litigation
brought by members of the public who may be harmed by an invalid patent,
because these citizens lack a legally cognizable interest despite any identifi-
able injury in fact that might suffice under Lujan.  Such a general ban on
public patent litigation on the basis of justiciability likely fails to address the
goal of the patent system to promote progress by balancing the public’s right
to free competition with the incentive to innovate.  The public interest in
justiciability for patent cases is discussed below.
II. THE RISE IN PUBLIC PATENT LITIGATION
Courts often have been asked to consider public harms created by pat-
ents.133  The grant of exclusive rights to patentees “carries out a public policy
adopted by the Constitution and laws of the United States, ‘to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . .
Inventors the exclusive Right . . .’ to their ‘new and useful’ inventions.”134  In
Pennock v. Dialogue, Justice Story referred to the “promotion of progress” as
“the ‘main object’” of the patent system, the “‘reward of inventors [being]
secondary and merely a means to that end.’”135  The Court continued in
Kendall v. Winsor, “[T]he rights and welfare of the community must be fairly
dealt with and effectually guarded.  Considerations of individual emolument
can never be permitted to operate to the injury of these.”136  When patents
claim old or obvious inventions, when patents claim inventions more broadly
than what was invented, or when patents are granted on ineligible subject
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1382.
133 See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944) (citing
cases).
134 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1940)), abrogated by Ill. Tool
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
135 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942) (quoting Pennock v. Dia-
logue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829)).
136 Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 329 (1858).
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matter, such grants of private exclusive rights are contrary to that important
public policy.137
After passage of state and federal antitrust laws in the late nineteenth
century, the exclusive rights granted by the patent allowed patentees to do
exactly what these competition laws were designed to prohibit: unduly
restrain competition through price controls, tie sales of unpatented goods to
sales of patentable ones, or raise claims of contributory infringement against
a supplier of unpatented goods.138  At first, patentees avoided antitrust liabil-
ity by virtue of the patent’s limited right to exclude others.139  Patent law did
not afford relief when a patentee dictated restrictive licensing terms because,
reasoned the courts, the patentee held the right to refuse to license on any
terms.140  As patentees pushed the boundaries of allowable competitive
restraint by introducing licenses of all stripes, the courts began to use anti-
trust principles to declare tying arrangements and price restrictions illegal as
a matter of patent law.141
During World War II, the Court went even further to recognize for the
first time in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co. an affirmative defense of pat-
ent misuse to an infringement claim.142  Any so-called misuse of the patent,
namely undue restraints on trade (including price fixing, monopolizing, and
creating tying arrangements), rendered the patent unenforceable against the
alleged infringer until the patentee cured the misuse.143  Reiterating the
public welfare concerns of Justice Story and the early courts, the Court in
Morton Salt explained that unenforceability in cases of misuse was in the pub-
lic interest: “The patentee, like these other holders of an exclusive privilege
137 Id. at 328.
138 See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 200–01 (1980) (discuss-
ing the competing policies of contributory infringement and patent misuse and the limits
of patentees’ exercise of control over unpatented articles used in their inventions); Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517–18 (1917) (holding the
tying of sale of unpatented goods to sale of patented ones as being “wholly outside of the
patent in suit and of the patent law as we have interpreted it”); J. Dianne Brinson, Patent
Misuse: Time for a Change, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 357, 360–66 (1990) (detail-
ing the history of the doctrine related to a fear of tying arrangements); Note, Patent Rights
and the Anti-Trust Laws, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 538, 542 & nn.1–2 (1917).  Congress enacted
the Sherman Act in 1890 and subsequently enacted the Clayton Act in 1914. See Robin C.
Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 403
n.11 (2003).
139 See Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 301
(6th Cir. 1896).
140 Id. at 294–95.
141 See, e.g., Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31 (1931) (finding
unenforceable restrictions tying a patented good to unpatented materials); Motion Picture
Patents, 243 U.S. at 518 (finding unenforceable restrictions tying a patented good to unpat-
ented supplies); Bauer v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 17 (1913) (finding unenforceable price
restrictions on downstream sales).
142 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493–94 (1942), abrogated by Ill.
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
143 Id.
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granted in the furtherance of a public policy, may not claim protection of his
grant by the courts where it is being used to subvert that policy.”144  In this
and later cases, the Court held that equitably, and as a matter of patent pol-
icy,145 a patentee will not be allowed to enforce his patent as long as he is
“impermissibly broadening the patent grant.”146  Accordingly, the patentee
may cure the misuse by eliminating the offensive restraint.147
The contours of the misuse doctrine have changed since its inception
(and since Congress’s explicit codification of what is not misuse in the 1952
Patent Act),148 but it remains a viable (albeit uncommonly successful)
defense with two surprising procedural characteristics.  One, an infringer can
use the misuse defense to escape all liability for infringement (akin to the
unclean hands doctrine in equity).149  Two, the infringer need not be
harmed by the misuse in question.150  The public harm created by the
anticompetitive effect of the misuse suffices to immunize the alleged
infringer (and others in his shoes) from infringement liability until the pat-
entee cures the misuse.151  Interestingly, no case has addressed whether a
144 Id. at 494; see Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944)
(listing cases addressing patent public policy); see also Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazel-
tine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 839 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“But what worse
enlargement of monopoly is there than the attachment of a patent to an unpatentable
article?  When we consider the constitutional standard, what greater public harm than that
is there in the patent system?”), overruled in part by Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 671
(1969).
145 J. Dianne Brinson describes the policy in Morton Salt as one of antitrust policy. See
Brinson, supra note 138, at 365 n.56.
146 See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see
also id. at 1331 (describing patent misuse as “‘patent leverage,’ i.e., the use of the patent
power to impose overbroad conditions on the use of the patent in suit”); Windsurfing Int’l,
Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001–02 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (describing patent misuse as
requiring unlawful restraints of competition).  The patent misuse doctrine has been criti-
cized as outmoded and unsound in light of developments in antitrust law and amendments
to the Patent Act. See Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent
Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599 (1990) (arguing that the misuse doctrine cannot be
defended economically); Brinson, supra note 138 (describing the misuse doctrine as R
anachronistic and suggesting elimination). But see Feldman, supra note 138, at 399–402
(explaining that the Federal Circuit’s antitrust analysis of misuse questions fails to capture
the policy concerns embodied in patent law).
147 Princo, 616 F.3d at 1328.
148 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006).
149 See Brinson, supra note 138, at 366 (“[T]he Court’s decision ‘was just as shocking as
if a careless motorist were able to defend the subsequent personal injury suit by proving
that the pedestrian had beaten his wife before leaving home.’” (quoting Zechariah Chafee,
Jr., Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1065, 1072 (1949))).
150 See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942), abrogated by Ill.
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Brinson, supra note 138, at 366.
151 See Lemley, supra note 146, at 1631 (arguing that “there is no reason to retain spe-
cific parts of the patent misuse doctrine, and very good reason to abolish the entire
defense” on the grounds that antitrust laws sufficiently deter anticompetitive behavior).
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declaratory plaintiff without plans to infringe and without threats from the
patentee can allege patent misuse in support of jurisdiction.
Anticompetitive harm may be the public harm most often associated
with the patent system’s careful balance of competition and innovation inter-
ests.152  However, in Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation, the Ninth Circuit identified a different type of harm, namely, the
harm to public health that may result from needy groups’ lack of access to a
patented invention.153  In Vitamin Technologists, the patentee refused to
license a patented process for irradiating margarine that would reduce rick-
ets and vitamin D deficiencies in children.154  The court took notice of the
prevalence of rickets in poorer populations and agonized over whether the
patentee’s refusal to provide access to the invention to the poor supported
the patentee’s profitable, supracompetitive monopoly.  As the court noted,
“[i]t is strongly arguable that such a suppression of the patent’s use is vastly
more against the public interest than its use for a mere control of prices . . .
or the tieing [sic] of unpatented with patented material . . . .”155  Although it
disposed of the case on invalidity grounds—finding all of the contested pat-
ent claims invalid and unenforceable on the merits—the court referred its
concerns about the welfare of the public to the Attorney General.156
Vitamin Technologists and other misuse cases described above refer to the
public policy underpinnings of the patent system as support for weighing
harms to the public interest (incidences of rickets among poorer populations
in Vitamin Technologists and anticompetitive conduct in the misuse cases)
against the value to be gained from the patentee’s ability to exclude others,
including the alleged infringers being sued (in both cases, this value would
presumably be the incentive to invent in the first place).157  Therefore, unen-
forceability on misuse grounds necessarily redresses harm to the public
152 See, e.g., Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Med. Prods., Inc., 387 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (“In patent cases the court’s refusal to accept a declaratory action also raises issues of
public interest, for patent rights are of competitive impact as well as innovation
incentive.”).
153 146 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1945).
154 Id. at 943.
155 Id. at 946.
156 Id.
157 As with any equitable defense, only a party with clean hands (i.e., one who has not
engaged in wrongdoing) may raise it, yet courts do not consider a patent infringer an
equitable wrongdoer for the purposes of standing in misuse cases. See C.R. Bard v. M3 Sys.,
157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998); B. Braun Med. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Hyundai Elecs. Indus., Co., 49 F. Supp. 2d 893,
917 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (citing Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244
(1933)).  Importantly, the court does not require that the party raising a misuse or unclean
hands defense suffer from the harm alleged to the public from the patentee’s conduct; see
Lemley, supra note 146, at 1618–19 (“Under current law, the patent infringer can take
advantage of the patent misuse doctrine whether or not she has been injured by the paten-
tee’s misuse. . . . The lack of an injury requirement often produces situations in which
parties who were not injured by misuse are the ones who benefit from the doctrine.”); see
also id. at 1631 (arguing that “there is no reason to retain specific parts of the patent
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rather than individual harm to the sued infringer.158  Precedent exists for
two basic propositions.  First, a declaratory plaintiff may raise a publicly
shared harm related to patent invalidity sufficient to satisfy Article III’s injury
in fact requirement.  Second, such publicly shared harm need not be limited
to anticompetitive harms that arise from restrictive licensing practices.  Sev-
eral recent patent cases involving public health concerns suggest that the
time has come for recognizing justiciability in patent cases where a declara-
tory plaintiff claims a publicly shared harm to be redressed by declaratory
relief invalidating the patent (and others like it through stare decisis).159
A. Association for Molecular Pathologists: Breast Cancer Gene Patents
The declaratory plaintiffs in AMP collectively sought to invalidate pat-
ents claiming certain isolated genes and diagnostic methods relating to
breast cancer.160  Patents directed toward genetic subject matter have gener-
ated much public debate regarding whether such patents are sound ethically
or morally.161  Despite the public outcry, many thousands of companies have
received patents on isolated gene components and methods of diagnosing
diseases using DNA sequences on the grounds that this subject matter is pat-
ent eligible based on Diamond v. Chakrabarty, a seminal case interpreting 35
U.S.C. § 101162 as allowing patenting for “‘anything under the sun that is
made by man.’”163  By claiming that these patents are invalid under § 101, a
successful challenge would render valueless all patents directed toward simi-
lar subject matter by recasting the patent eligibility requirement of § 101 to
exclude an entire class of subject matter—genetic material.
AMP’s declaratory plaintiffs were comprised of genetic researchers, med-
ical practitioners who referred patients to the patent owner’s facility to be
misuse doctrine, and very good reason to abolish the entire defense” on the grounds that
antitrust laws sufficiently deter anticompetitive behavior).
158 See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942), abrogated by Ill.
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).  In contrast, an antitrust plaintiff
must demonstrate competitive harm in order to demonstrate standing to bring suit. See,
e.g., City of New York v. Grp. Health Inc., 649 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2011) (“To state a
claim under [the antitrust laws], a plaintiff must allege a plausible relevant market in
which competition will be impaired.”); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238
(2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he [plaintiff] must demonstrate that within the relevant market, the
defendants’ actions have had substantial adverse effects on competition . . . .”).
159 See AMP, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part on other grounds, rev’d in part on
other grounds sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (AMP II), 133
S. Ct. 2017 (June 13, 2013); Mama Cares, 825 F. Supp. 2d 178 (D.D.C. 2011); Organic Seed
Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
160 AMP, 689 F.3d at 1309.
161 See Talk of the Nation: Breast Cancer Gene Patents Challenged (National Public Radio
broadcast Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.
php?storyId=121343433.
162 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
163 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at
5 (1952)) (finding invented microorganisms “patentable subject matter”).
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tested for certain genetic mutations identified in the patents, and patients
whose insurance did not cover either the initial testing, or second testing for
patients whose first results were inconclusive.164  Nearly ten years before the
declaratory plaintiffs filed their complaint, Myriad Genetics, Inc. (“Myriad”),
the exclusive licensee of the patents challenged in AMP, sued one company
(not a party to AMP) for patent infringement and sent cease-and-desist let-
ters with license offers to several of the declaratory plaintiff researchers.165
At least one researcher admitted on the record that he was ready, able, and
willing to conduct arguably infringing activity if the patent were to be held
invalid by the court.166  On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the willing-
ness of this researcher to engage in potentially infringing activity, in combi-
nation with Myriad’s earlier enforcement maneuvers, created a dispute
sufficiently real and immediate to establish Article III jurisdiction.167
Importantly, the court noted that the researcher need not bet the farm
by engaging in the arguably infringing activity now; he could instead chal-
lenge the patents in court based on future plans to practice the patented
invention.168  This is a restatement of the precise wording of MedImmune.169
But AMP is not a licensee case.  The declaratory plaintiff’s interest is deter-
mined by his desire to practice a presumably valid patent—a desire that may
be held by many individuals whom Myriad has not threatened with an
infringement action.  Moreover, Myriad did not reach out to many of the
plaintiffs, if at all; when it did reach out to those few, it did so a decade
earlier.  Myriad’s hypothetical coercive action for infringement was not on
the doorstep of the courthouse.  However, the Federal Circuit considered all
the circumstances in order to hold that the dispute was immediate and real,
at least as to the one plaintiff who was ready, willing, and able to infringe
upon invalidation of the patents.170  By casting this individual plaintiff as a
potential competitor, the court was able to frame the injury as one to the
plaintiff’s right to freely operate without exclusion from the patent owner—a
right that apparently did not become a legally cognizable interest until the
plaintiff professed his readiness and willingness to infringe at some point.
B. Mama Cares Foundation: Ready-to-Eat Therapeutic Food Patents
In Mama Cares Foundation v. Nutriset Société Par Actions Cimplifiée, the
declaratory plaintiffs, Mama Cares Foundation and Breedlove Foods (collec-
tively, “Mama Cares”)—two non-profit companies focused on the problem of
global hunger—claimed that the patentee’s refusal to license the patented
process for manufacturing Plumpy’nut® ready-to-eat therapeutic food prod-
164 AMP, 689 F.3d at 1308.
165 Id. at 1321.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1321–23.
168 Id. at 1322.
169 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 134 (2007).
170 AMP, 689 F.3d at 1321–22.
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ucts harmed its efforts to eradicate world hunger.171  In order to remedy this
harm, Mama Cares requested a declaratory judgment of non-infringement
and invalidity on the grounds that the patent’s claims were too vague to sus-
tain protection.  After the patentee challenged justiciability on Article III
grounds, Mama Cares argued that the dispute comprised a “‘substantial con-
troversy . . . of sufficient immediacy and reality’”172 (MedImmune’s new stan-
dard) because the patentee declined to license the patent to others in the
United States and sent a warning to the therapeutic food industry that it
would take steps to enforce its patent against infringers.173  The court dis-
missed the action, emphasizing the lack of affirmative acts by the patentee
directed toward these particular declaratory plaintiffs—industry warnings
and a refusal to license others did not rise to the level of conduct causing an
Article III prescribed injury in fact.174  Like other courts using the Federal
Circuit’s post-MedImmune precedent to determine questions of justiciability,
the court focused on the underlying cause of action for infringement and
determined that no cause of action had yet accrued because the patentee
failed to reach out to Mama Cares in order to enforce the patent against
it.175  The public harm alleged by the plaintiffs in Mama Cares—a harm simi-
lar to one identified as problematic by the court in Vitamin Technologists—was
not considered by the court to support justiciability, despite the case’s focus
on the problem of global hunger.176
C. Organic Seed Growers Trade Association: Genetically Modified
Food Patents
Like patents covering genetic subject matter, patents claiming geneti-
cally modified food implicate the public debate regarding the harms associ-
ated with “Frankenfood” and whether such food should be sold and
171 Mama Cares, 825 F. Supp. 2d 178, 180 (D.D.C. 2011).  The patent claimed the prep-
aration and use of foods or nutritional supplements in the treatment of malnutrition, and
the product sold under the patent is known commonly by its brand name, Plumpy’nut®.
Id.  “Plumpy’nut® is a peanut-based product that does not need to be mixed with water,
has a two-year shelf life, and does not require refrigeration.  These qualities make
Plumpy’nut® a particularly effective tool in combating severe malnutrition in developing
countries.” Id.  Mama Cares and Breedlove developed their own peanut-based ready-to-eat
therapeutic food designed to treat malnutrition. Id.
172 MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S.
270, 273 (1941)).
173 Mama Cares, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 182–83.
174 Id. at 183–84.
175 Id.
176 Courts have trimmed the reach of the patent misuse doctrine to public harms cre-
ated by the abuse of market power and not by refusals to license.  Therefore, the patentee’s
refusal to license would not have supported a claim for patent misuse to render the patent
invalid.  Because misuse is a statutory defense, this should say nothing about whether the
harm may suffice to create standing under Lujan.
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distributed globally.177  The declaratory plaintiffs in OSGTA—a group of
organic seed growers and organic farms—filed a declaratory complaint
against Monsanto Company (“Monsanto”)—the owner of many patents
directed toward genetic plant technology used in growing genetically modi-
fied food—despite a desire to not infringe the patents in suit.178  The declar-
atory plaintiffs alleged that the patent was invalid for a variety of reasons,
including a claim that it lacks the utility required for patent eligibility by
§ 101.179  Although Monsanto is a well-known litigant when it comes to
enforcing its genetic seed patents,180 the district court held that the declara-
tory plaintiffs did not persuade the court that the dispute was immediate:
Monsanto had not threatened any individual plaintiff with infringement liti-
gation, and no individual plaintiff had, to its knowledge, infringed the pat-
ent.181  On appeal, the Federal Circuit conceded that trace amounts of
patented genetic material would infringe the patent, but held that Monsanto
made the controversy moot by promising not to sue any inadvertent infring-
ers like the organic farmers who brought the suit.182
The declaratory plaintiffs claimed that the propagation of genetically
modified seeds by Monsanto would lead to inevitable contamination of gen-
eral seed populations through wind dispersal, cross-pollination, and other
contamination processes.183  As a result, the organic farmers and seed grow-
ers—who have a strong personal and professional desire to not infringe
because infringement would taint their organic seed lines with unwanted
genetic characteristics—almost certainly would become infringers at some
unknown point in the future.184  The inevitable but undesired infringement
argument failed to convince the court that the declaratory plaintiffs needed
anticipatory relief—Monsanto’s assurances that it would not sue inadvertent
infringers rendered any controversy moot.185
D. Defining the Need for Public Patent Litigation
Courts necessarily framed each of these cases as a competitive injury
case—the only way to utilize the declaratory judgment procedure to obtain
177 See Brooke Glass-O’Shea, The History and Future of Genetically Modified Crops:
Frankenfoods, Superweeds, and the Developing World, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2011) (discuss-
ing the advent of “frankenfoods”).
178 OSGTA, 851 F. Supp. 2d 544, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 718 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
179 Amended Complaint at 53, OSGTA, 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11-cv-
2163); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (establishing utility requirement for patents).
180 See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Monsanto’s Harvest of Fear, VANITY FAIR, May
2008, available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/05/monsanto200805;
FOOD, INC. (Magnolia Home Entertainment 2008).
181 OSGTA, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
182 Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1359–61
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
183 See OSGTA, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 548–49.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 549.
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anticipatory relief in declaratory patent cases because of the requirement of a
legally cognizable interest associated with an accrued infringement cause of
action.186  Courts identify the injury as one to the plaintiff’s right to freely
practice the claimed invention, but this legally cognizable right is not availa-
ble unless and until an underlying cause of action for infringement becomes
cognizable, which requires proof of the patentee’s affirmative acts toward the
declaratory plaintiff and the declaratory plaintiff’s desire and ability to
infringe the patent but for the patentee’s right to exclude.187  The tethering
of declaratory justiciability and an underlying infringement cause of action
makes sense legally (as described above in Section I.C) and historically (the
Declaratory Judgments Act envisioned only harassed infringers bringing suit
against the harassing patentees188).  However, as MedImmune itself demon-
strates, the underlying cause of action for infringement need not have
accrued, in the legal sense, in order to support justiciability; rather, the Court
cautioned lower courts to make decisions based on “all the
circumstances.”189
This resulting doublethink creates problems at the margins for would-be
competitors who have not been threatened by cautious patentees.  Such
would-be competitors could craft a complaint alleging justiciability without
much more than vague threats and a desire and ability to infringe.  Indeed,
this is precisely the sort of declaratory plaintiff the AMP court approved.190
In AMP, the Federal Circuit stretched the MedImmune standard to its
broadest point yet, finding one plaintiff who was ready, willing, and able to
infringe upon invalidation of the patents in suit.  The affirmative acts that
courts have been demanding of declaratory plaintiffs in patent cases post-
MedImmune were lacking in AMP, yet justiciability remained.
Moreover, despite the doublethink of suggesting broad justiciability
requirements while demanding a legally cognizable underlying infringement
action, courts ignore the policy concerns raised in many patent cases as to
the welfare of the public.191  Accordingly, the “problem” of justiciability in
declaratory patent cases, on its face, appears to be a small one—the group of
would-be competitors who are not sure whether their complaint rises to the
level needed to trigger justiciability.  Yet a hidden problem may be much
larger.  Patents grant exclusive private rights to spur innovation, but these
186 See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1292 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (discussing the exclusions of the declaratory plaintiff from drug market).
187 See AMP, 689 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming the district court’s finding
that declaratory plaintiffs had the ability and desire to engage in infringement, as well as
the belief that such testing was within their rights, but could not do so without risking
infringement liability), aff’d in part on other grounds, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom.
AMP II, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (June 13, 2013); SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480
F.3d 1372, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (requiring a showing of affirmative acts by the paten-
tee toward the declaratory plaintiff).
188 See BORCHARD, supra note 34, at 812. R
189 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007).
190 See AMP, 689 F.3d at 1321 n.8, 1321–22.
191 See supra text accompanying notes 15–16.
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rights come with a cost to society in the form of direct costs, like reduced
competition and administrative expenses, and in the form of indirect costs,
like inadequate health care for those who cannot afford patented medicines
and diagnostic measures or a lack of diversity in agricultural crops due to
genetically modified organism dispersal.192  Article III standing and other
justiciability doctrines need not ignore the public harm, writ large, from inva-
lid patents.  Nor should these doctrines ignore the individual harms suffered
by members of the public when unwarranted exclusive rights are given to a
private party.  The very existence of a patent restricts any individual’s free-
dom to operate because a patent carries a presumption of validity and explic-
itly gives the patentee the right to enforce the patent against anyone, even
innocent infringers.193
Normatively, it makes little sense to find justiciable those cases where
would-be competitors have a very small risk of being drawn into an infringe-
ment action (as in AMP) yet not find justiciable those cases where the patent
(or patents) in suit, through threatened enforcement against others, the chil-
ling of competition, or lack of access for the neediest individuals, harms indi-
vidual members of the public by reducing competition unnecessarily without
an accompanying and more beneficial promotion of innovation (as in, possi-
bly, Mama Cares).  Instead of framing these cases as ones involving competi-
tors—trying to fit them to the Federal Circuit’s precedent involving
competitive injury and an underlying legally cognizable interest in a future
infringement action—perhaps the time has come for public patent litigation,
where plaintiffs are able to raise not only the public’s dual rights to competi-
tion and innovation as promised by the patent system, but other harms like
the lack of access to medicines presented by the Mama Cares and Vitamin
Technologists cases.
III. A LIMITED CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO CHALLENGE PATENTS
The historical coupling of an infringement claim and its invalidity coun-
terpart arose from pre-declaratory judgment cases wherein invalidity could
only be raised as a defense to an infringement claim.194  Now commonplace,
the declaratory judgment procedure (as described in Part I) allows a claim
192 See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (“Licensees may often be the only
individuals with enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor’s
discovery.  If they are muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute to
would-be monopolists without need or justification.”).
193 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”); see 35 U.S.C. § 287
(2006 & Supp. V 2011) (requiring only constructive notice of patent by patentees, thus
leaving innocent infringers who have not received actual notice liable); see also Christopher
A. Harkins, Choosing Between the Advice of Counsel Defense to Willful Patent Infringement or the
Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel: A Bridge or the Troubled Waters?, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 210, 221 (2007) (“Even innocent parties may be liable for patent infringement . . . an
innocent infringer is no less liable than a willful infringer.” (footnote omitted)).
194 See, e.g., W. Bickford Co. v. Merrill, 268 F. 540, 541 (1st Cir. 1920) (“This is a patent
infringement case.  The defenses are invalidity and noninfringement.”).
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for relief in the form of a judgment of patent non-infringement and/or inva-
lidity, but only in those instances where the case otherwise meets Article III’s
justiciability requirement.195  Courts have taken this to mean, at a minimum,
that a legally cognizable infringement case must be possible for the patentee
to bring suit against the declaratory plaintiff.196  This possibility may be quite
remote, as in licensee cases like MedImmune (where the licensee fears the
consequences of terminating or breaching the license and so the license
remains in force) but the possibility nevertheless may create a continuing
dispute that sends the licensee to court to seek a remedy in the form of
declaratory relief.197
When a court focuses on the declaratory defendant’s underlying cause
of action for infringement in order to find a legally cognizable right on the
part of the declaratory plaintiff, the court essentially demands that the declar-
atory plaintiff raise a competitive injury in order to establish justiciability.
This injury, characterized by the Federal Circuit as a restraint on the declara-
tory plaintiff’s legally cognizable right to free exploitation of non-infringing
goods, describes a large majority of the injuries in declaratory patent cases.
Declaratory plaintiffs more often than not are current or future competitors
of the patentee, someone for whom infringing without paying tribute to the
patent owner would provide a competitive advantage.198  For this reason, in
cases featuring threats by the patentee and potential infringing activity, the
declaratory judgment procedure can and does provide adequate relief when
the plaintiff identifies as his injury a restraint on his freedom to exploit non-
infringing products or processes.
Declaratory plaintiffs who do not face threats from a patentee and are
not poised to infringe the patent will be turned away routinely from federal
court on justiciability grounds.  In MedImmune and elsewhere, courts have
stated that Article III does not recognize such a remote or speculative
infringement case in support of the claim for declaratory relief.199  However,
MedImmune’s “all the circumstances” standard is not inconsistent with the
normative claim that a non-infringing member of the public could be
195 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
196 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (holding that the mere possibility of a future suit was an injury sufficient to find a
justiciable controversy).
197 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. CV 03–2567 MRP, 2004 WL 3770589, at
*5–6 (C.D. Cal. April 26, 2004).  Interestingly, the court stated that the bringing of the
invalidity suit creates the dispute sufficient for Article III, which seems a bit beyond the
statement in MedImmune.
198 See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (identifying the alleged injury in fact as a “‘restraint on the free exploitation of
non-infringing goods’” (quoting Red Wing Shoe Co., Inc. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc.,
148 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998))).
199 See, e.g., Velvet Underground v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., 890 F.
Supp. 2d 398, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that the injury claimed was not “‘of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment’” (quoting MedIm-
mune, 549 U.S. at 127)).
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allowed to bring a declaratory judgment claim for patent invalidity separate
from any immediate (and cognizable) underlying claim for infringement.
The easiest mechanism for realizing this normative claim outside of the con-
fusing declaratory judgment context involves legislative action.  First, Con-
gress could enact a statutory cause of action for invalidating a patent in order
to create a legally cognizable right sufficient to create federal jurisdiction
without utilizing the tortuous declaratory judgment procedure and without
requiring infringement as a touchstone for the declaratory plaintiff’s legal
right.  Next, courts could accept individual harms that are shared by the pub-
lic as injuries in fact sufficient to support standing for such a citizen’s action
to invalidate a patent under the Court’s Lujan framework.  Each of these is
addressed below.
A. A Carefully Crafted Statutory Right to Sue
The Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”200
Under this power, Congress could create a statutory right to challenge a pat-
ent in a civil action for invalidity or unenforceability.  “[T]he importance to
the public at large of resolving questions of patent validity”201 supports mak-
ing a civil action for cancelling a patent available to parties claiming a right
to free exploitation of the claimed invention, a legally cognizable interest
recognized by statute without the cumbersome procedure of the declaratory
judgment mechanism.
The Supreme Court paved the way for a statutory right to invalidate by
first recognizing the separability of a declaratory invalidity claim (or counter-
claim) from an infringement claim (or counterclaim).  In Altvater v. Freeman,
the Court famously proclaimed, “[t]o hold a patent valid if it is not infringed
is to decide a hypothetical case.”202  However, in the very next sentence, the
Court carefully distinguished invalidity as a defense (pled in an answer to a
bill of infringement) from invalidity as a counterclaim.203  The invalidity
counterclaim, the Court suggested, could stand alone despite dismissal of the
infringement bill, provided it had independent justiciability under Article III
(in that case, supplied by other claims and devices in dispute).204  Later, after
the Federal Circuit made a practice of vacating invalidity judgments on
appeal upon affirming non-infringement judgments, the Court reiterated
that a non-infringement judgment did not moot an invalidity judgment, nor
did it support vacating such judgments—when the district court has jurisdic-
tion to consider the invalidity counterclaim independent of the infringement
200 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
201 Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 101 (1993) (citing
Blonder–Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971)).
202 Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363 (1943).
203 Id.
204 Id.
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charge, the Federal Circuit retains the power to decide the question of inva-
lidity.205  Thus claims for invalidating patents could stand alone, provided
such claims were, in their own right, justiciable.
The first step to recognizing justiciable claims for patent invalidation for
members of the public would be to delineate a legal right to free exploitation
of non-infringing activity separate from, and not dependent upon, the paten-
tee’s legal right to enforce the patent.206  Because the patent grants to the
patentee the right to exclude all from practicing the invention in violation of
35 U.S.C. § 281,207 the right to free exploitation of non-infringing activity
should belong to all citizens regardless of underlying infringement threats.
Therefore, Congress could model this new legal right on the legal rights
granted by the citizen suit provisions found in environmental laws.208  A citi-
zen suit provision granted to members of the public in order to adjudicate a
legal right to free exploitation of non-infringing activity would advance the
public interest in policing patents in federal courts, a policy endorsed by the
Supreme Court in misuse cases as well as in Lear209 and, most recently, in
MedImmune.210
Congress has the broad authority to create legal injuries sufficient to
provide standing to members of the public to challenge patents in court.211
In Federal Election Commission v. Akins,212 for example, Congress created a
right to bring suit to any person “aggrieved” by a Federal Election Commis-
sion decision.  The right created, then, was defined as a right to information
about political committees and the Federal Election Commission’s decision
at issue denied plaintiffs’ right to that information, which was “deemed suffi-
cient to meet Article III and to allow standing under the broad citizen suit
provision for any aggrieved person.”213  The Court emphasized that the term
“aggrieved” indicates a “congressional intent to cast the standing net
205 Cardinal Chem. Co., 508 U.S. at 98.
206 Recall from Section I.C above that the declaratory judgment procedure will not
allow recognizing the right to free exploitation of non-infringing activity without establish-
ing an imminent underlying cause of action for infringement.
207 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006).
208 Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1187–89
(2009).  Magill describes the citizen suit provisions in the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act,
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, Noise Control Act, Endangered Species
Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.
Id.  According to Magill, Congress envisioned citizens as private enforcers of the environ-
mental laws, even against private defendants as well as federal agencies. See Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 209 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (“By permitting citizens to pursue civil penalties payable to the Federal Treasury, the
Act does not provide a mechanism for individual relief in any traditional sense, but turns
over to private citizens the function of enforcing the law.”).
209 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670–71 (1969).
210 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007).
211 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 2.3, at 72 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 R
U.S. 11 (1998)).
212 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
213 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 2.3, at 72–73. R
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broadly—beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights
upon which ‘prudential’ standing traditionally rested.”214  A statutory right
to cancel a patent given to a person aggrieved by the grant of the patent itself
appropriately constrains the availability of the civil action to only those per-
sons who suffer an injury within the zone of interests to be protected by the
provision in the first place—the harms that arise when an unwarranted right
to exclude is granted to a patentee.  A civil action granting a statutory right to
bring suit to cancel a patent provides a mechanism for challenging patents
that circumvents the tortuous declaratory judgment procedure associated
with the civil action for infringement.  And providing such a civil action
allows Congress to make clear to courts that a policy of encouraging more
patent challenges works to enhance the system already in place.  By creating
a legal interest in the form of a civil action, the inquiry rightfully will revolve
around the injury in fact suffered by the plaintiffs in suit—is this plaintiff
harmed by this potentially invalid patent in a way that supports standing to
bring suit?
Some scholars have questioned congressional authority to create legal
rights in the form of citizen suits on separation of powers grounds—arguing
that allowing Congress to dictate law enforcement blurs the line between
congressional power and executive branch power.215  However, in the patent
context, citizens (with Article III standing, of course) will identify and chal-
lenge suspect patents on their merits.  Set within the patent system as a
whole, a legal right to nullify presents a special case where citizen challenges
to patents would advance the goals of the system to promote progress by
granting exclusive rights, while preserving the public interest in free competi-
tion where those rights are unwarranted.  Congress created the patent system
to incentivize innovators; recognizing a legal right to free exploitation simply
smoothes the route to ridding the system of invalid or unenforceable patents
rather than tipping a balance between legislative and executive function.
The citizen is not enforcing the patent laws in lieu of the USPTO, but rather
providing a backstop for nullifying patents after the regulatory process of
patent procurement has ended.216
A modest statute creating a legal right to free exploitation of non-
infringing activity must further identify who can sue for a violation of this
right, when the suit may be brought, and the remedy that may be sought.  In
one simple version, Congress could authorize anyone who is aggrieved by the
214 Akins, 524 U.S. at 19.
215 See Robin Kundis Craig, Will Separation of Powers Challenges “Take Care” of Environmen-
tal Citizen Suits? Article II, Injury-in-Fact, Private “Enforcers,” and Lessons from Qui Tam Litiga-
tion, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 93, 95–96 (2001); Charles S. Abell, Note, Ignoring the Trees for the
Forests: How the Citizen Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act Violates the Constitution’s Separation
of Powers Principle, 81 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1957–58 (1995).
216 This citizen-suit backstop is necessary because of the insufficiency of current post-
grant procedures. See Eric Williams, Note, Remembering the Public’s Interest in the Patent Sys-
tem - A Post-Grant Opposition Designed to Benefit the Public, 2006 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F.,
at 1 (discussing the “absence of a timely, inexpensive mechanism for invalidating the high
number of bad patents being issued”).
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existence of the allegedly invalid patent to bring a civil action to obtain a
remedy in the form of a judgment of invalidity or unenforceability.  In this
formulation, a person may be aggrieved by harm to competition, where the
invalid patent limits consumer choice or freedom to operate by competitors.
A person may also be aggrieved by harm to innovation where the invalid
patent prevents technological advance within an industry.  Either version of
harm would suffice for standing to sue to protect the legal right created by
the statute and may embrace many public policy concerns.
The statute also could limit when aggrieved citizens may bring a suit to
invalidate a patent.  The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act has significantly
changed how members of the public challenge patents through administra-
tive procedures at the USPTO.217  As of March 2013, members of the public
may challenge a patent grant in a post-grant opposition procedure brought
within nine months from the patent’s grant.218  After expiration of the nine
months, members of the public may utilize the more limited inter partes reex-
amination procedures to cancel claims.219  The UPSTO recently proposed
rules for each of these procedures, which are intended to provide a parallel
path for invalidation in district courts after the patent has been granted.220
Notably, the post-grant opposition procedures aspire to reduce the costs that
may amass from an invalid patent over time by allowing for cancellation rela-
tively soon after the grant.  For this reason, the proposed statute should, at a
minimum, require nine months to expire from the grant of the patent in
order to accommodate the post-grant opposition procedures.221  The inter
partes procedures may be brought any time after the nine months expire, and
would simply continue to provide a parallel path for invalidity within the
USPTO.  For many years, the USPTO reexamination procedures have co-
existed with district court determinations of invalidity, offering a cheaper and
more expeditious route to cancellation for many dubious patents.222  There
is no reason to believe that an additional mechanism for streamlined invalid-
ity actions in district courts would hamper the goals of these procedures.  In
fact, under the proposed rules, any party who has previously filed a civil
action seeking to challenge the patentability of a patent may not institute
217 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
218 See § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 299–313 (adding 35 U.S.C. § 325 for post-grant review).
219 See Pub. L. No. 112-274, § 1(d)(2), 126 Stat. 2456 (adding 35 U.S.C. § 311 for inter
partes reviews).
220 Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Pro-
ceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg.
48,680 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
221 The European patent rules also recognize this and require nine months to accom-
modate post-grant opposition of patents. See Convention on the Grant of European Pat-
ents (European Patent Convention) art. 99, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (as amended
Nov. 29, 2000), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2010/
e/ar99.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
222 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 305, 314 (2006) (determining that reexamination proceedings shall
be conducted with “special dispatch” within the patent office).
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either a post-grant review or an inter partes reexamination.223  These features
ensure that members of the public will hesitate before instituting the more
expensive yet more robust district court proceedings under the proposed
statute.224
Moreover, the importance of the public interest in policing allegedly
bad patents suggests that inter partes procedures be supplemented with a right
to invalidate in district courts for aggrieved persons identifying harms of pub-
lic importance.  The new inter partes procedures, as proposed by the USPTO
to be implemented in 2013, allow members of the public to raise questions of
substantial patentability for any and all claims of a patent, whereupon the
USPTO reviews these questions to determine whether these identified claims
pass muster under the Patent Act (i.e., novel, not obvious, and adequately
disclosed).225  Although the decisions from the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board are appealable to the Federal Circuit, public interest groups may find
it more desirable to bring suit for invalidity in a district court of their choos-
ing, where appeal also may be taken to the Federal Circuit.  The district court
provides a more transparent forum for challenges.
One possible counterargument to providing a right to invalidate to any
aggrieved person may be that a citizen suit provision would increase the num-
ber of litigations brought to invalidate patents and thus would strain our
already burdened federal court dockets.  As demonstrated in Part II above,
public interest groups already bring suits in those cases where the public has
an interest in patent invalidation and seek plaintiff members who may best
get over the Article III standing hurdle.  A statute creating a right to invali-
date would simply make this mechanism easier for litigants who are able to
establish an injury in fact by eliminating the narrower view that imminent
infringement litigation provides the only route for a legally cognizable inter-
est in invalidation.  This alone would prevent any rush to the courthouse for
all questionable patents.  Patent litigations are very costly, which could pro-
hibit all but the most serious suits.  Despite the added expense, federal court
determinations of invalidity may be more preferable despite the added
expense in important public cases (high profile or critical to an entire indus-
try, as in AMP).  In some cases, the litigants also challenge patent policy
through the federal courts—interpreting the Patent Act’s provisions and the
USPTO’s regulations are functions that cannot be accommodated by the
administrative proceedings available at the USPTO for amendment to or
invalidation of patents.
Congress has already granted the right to bring declaratory judgment
claims of invalidity, non-infringement, and unenforceability to generic com-
223 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
224 The statute effectively forces those challenging a patent to choose either to utilize
inter partes review or to pursue a remedy in the courts, to the exclusion of the other. See 35
U.S.C. § 315 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
225 See Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, supra note 220.
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panies under the amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act.226  The recent
provisions in the Affordable Care Act relating to biologics also create a cause
of action for declaratory challenges to patents.227  Although helpful in sort-
ing out the issues described above when determining justiciability in declara-
tory patent cases, this Article proposes that the declaratory judgment
mechanism is a poor one for raising invalidity issues.  Therefore, even these
provisions could be amended to grant a legally cognizable right to bring suit
to invalidate, recognizing that generic companies and competing biologics
makers most likely would have standing to sue under Article III regardless of
the fictional infringement mechanism found in the Hatch-Waxman Act or
the Affordable Care Act.
B. Public Patent Injuries in Fact
Despite its legislative power, Congress cannot statutorily create a legal
interest in persons who have not suffered an injury in fact as proscribed by
Article III.228  Once Congress creates a legally cognizable right to free
exploitation of non-infringing goods and a corresponding civil action to
obtain relief, a member of the public who seeks to challenge a patent on the
grounds that he shares in a public harm still must allege and prove an injury
in fact caused by the defendant and redressable by the court.229  Although
many scholars have challenged this requirement as not constitutionally man-
dated,230 the Supreme Court has continued to reiterate that the injury in fact
requirement cannot be circumvented by legislation—it is a constitutional
requirement.
A stranger to the patentee with no plans to infringe and who alleges a
public harm to competition that affects general health and safety does not
seem, superficially at least, very different from a taxpayer challenging
expenditures of the federal coffers or one ideologically devoted to challeng-
ing environmental laws.231  Although the member of the public in these
cases may seem analogous to an ideological plaintiff, the better analogy may
be that the member of the public seeks to raise a generalized grievance, a
harm individually suffered by many people.  Courts have generally prohibited
226 Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, H.R. 2491, 108th Cong.
§ 2(a)(2)(C) (2003); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 405 F.3d 990, 995 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (indicating that the plain language of the Hatch-Waxman Act provides an “express
mechanism for generics to challenge, with declaratory actions, the claim scope or validity
of listed patents”).
227 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
228 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576–78 (1992) (“‘Individual rights’
within the meaning of this passage, do not mean public rights that have been legislatively
pronounced to belong to each individual who forms part of the public.”).
229 Id. at 578.
230 See, e.g., Hessick, supra note 40, at 277–78 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing
after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166 (1992).
231 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102–03 (1968) (describing the nexus test for taxpayer
standing); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 566–67 (describing the nexus required when challenging
environmental laws).
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plaintiffs from seeking to adjudicate generalized grievances on prudential
grounds,232 which means that Congress could legislate around the prohibi-
tion by creating a statutory cause of action for aggrieved persons, and such
persons need only demonstrate an Article III injury in fact.
The crux of standing in these cases will be for the plaintiffs to show some
particularized, concrete, and individual injury in fact.233  For example, a
member of the public may claim an individual injury resulting from the risk
or uncertainty that her activity infringes a patent, where the uncertainty chills
investment and redirects her efforts into other endeavors.234  Likewise, a
member of the public may claim an individual injury resulting from a lack of
access to the patented invention as a result of the patentee’s exclusion of
others within the marketplace for the invention.  Such injuries could still be
characterized as competitive ones—these parties would allege a desire to
infringe, or a desire that others be able to infringe, and such desires could be
deemed a sufficient injury in fact without identifying an immediate underly-
ing infringement claim.235
C. Proposed Statute
The courts of the United States shall, to the extent consistent with the Constitu-
tion, have subject matter jurisdiction when any person brings a civil action under
section 2201 of title 28 for a declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid or not
infringed and such person alleges an injury relating to a restraint on his trade or to his
health or safety.  No such civil action may be brought until ninety days after the date
upon which the patent issues.  A civil action brought under this provision shall have
no effect on any pending or future request for an inter partes review of the patent in
suit, except that a court, in its discretion, may stay any or all proceedings until resolu-
tion of the inter partes review and a court may decline jurisdiction pursuant to sec-
tion 2201 of title 28 on the grounds that an inter partes review remains pending.
CONCLUSION
In MedImmune, the Supreme Court opened the door for courts consider-
ing jurisdiction in patent cases to allow policy concerns to override constitu-
tional and statutory jurisdictional constraints.  A strong public policy interest
in invalidating patents may suggest an expansion of justiciability to encom-
232 See Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideo-
logical Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1033–37 (1968) (discussing that courts have tradi-
tionally required in a case that there be a “plaintiff who proffers for judicial determination
a question concerning his own legal status”).
233 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–62.
234 Brief of Intellectual Property Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
9, Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 228 U.S. 618 (2012) (No. 11-982) (“When a person is
deterred from undertaking valuable economic activity by the risk that the activity may
encroach on another’s exclusive right, that person has incurred an actual, concrete, and
particularized injury.”).
235 See supra note 158 for cases discussing a finding of competitive harm in antitrust
cases.
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pass patent cases brought by concerned citizens.  Because of the potential for
important public implications for allegedly invalid patents, this Article pro-
poses that the tension between patent policy and law best be resolved by a
congressional authorization of a cause of action for invalidation to be
brought by aggrieved citizens, with appropriate and thoughtful contours to
supplement the competitor suits already allowed under the declaratory judg-
ment procedure.
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